Stoic affirmations
Stoic self-worth affirmations, in the Stoics’ own words
The Stoics wrote no self-worth affirmations, but Epictetus placed a person’s worth exactly: in opinion, pursuit, desire and aversion, the things in our power, and not in reputation or command. Marcus Aurelius adds that what is beautiful is beautiful in itself and is made neither worse nor better by being praised.
In the texts
Epictetus · Enchiridion, I
In our Power are Opinion, Pursuit, Desire, Aversion, and in one Word, whatever are our own Actions.
Epictetus · Enchiridion, XXIV
And how is it true, that you will be no-body any-where; when you ought to be some-body in those Things only, which are in your own Power, in which you may be of the greatest Consequence?
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, IV, 20
Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised.
The Enchiridion of Epictetus, in Elizabeth Carter’s 1758 translation, opens with a division of things into two classes. The first, quoted above, is made of our own actions; the second covers what comes from outside, reputation among it. The first class are by nature free and unhindered; the others are weak, slavish and belong to others. Whoever takes what belongs to others for his own, the chapter goes on, will be hindered, will lament and will find fault with gods and men (Dichotomy of control).
Chapter XXIV applies the division to the fear of counting for nothing. The objection is quoted in direct speech: “I shall live in Dishonour; and be no-body any-where.” Epictetus answers that dishonour cannot reach a person through another’s means, and that it is no business of ours to get power or to be invited to an entertainment. One ought to be somebody in the things that are in one’s own power, and there one may be of the greatest consequence. The rest of the chapter weighs money against a friend of fidelity and honour, and asks what use a citizen is to his country once he has become faithless (Prohairesis).
Marcus Aurelius approaches worth through praise, in book IV of the Meditations, translated by George Long in 1862. Everything beautiful is beautiful in itself and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself; a thing is made neither worse nor better by being praised. He extends the rule to law, truth, benevolence and modesty, and comes to an emerald: is it made worse than it was if it is not praised (Adiaphora)? Book IV has its page: Book IV.
In both authors, worth is a fact about what a person does with his own judgment. Praise and reputation are real, but they belong to others; neither adds to that worth nor takes from it.
Why this is not a positive affirmation
A self-worth affirmation asks the reader to declare himself worthy, enough or deserving, and to repeat it until the feeling follows. Epictetus does not ask for a declaration. He draws a line between two kinds of things and states on which side a person’s good lies; whether one’s worth is high or low is then a question about one’s judgments and choices, not about the words one says to oneself.
Marcus Aurelius goes further: if praise from others adds nothing to what is beautiful, praise from oneself adds nothing either. The Stoic texts take worth out of the register of approval altogether, including self-approval.
Terms in the glossary
- Dichotomy of control — τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν / τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (ta eph’ hēmin, ta ouk eph’ hēmin)
- Prohairesis — προαίρεσις (prohairesis)
- Adiaphora — ἀδιάφορα (adiaphora)
In Stoïque, the life theme “Letting go” opens the passages on this subject, each with its reference. The theme is part of Stoic+.