Glossary
Prosoche
προσοχή (prosochē)
Prosoche is the Greek prosochē, attention, and in Epictetus it names an unbroken watch over one’s own judgments and impulses. Discourses IV, 12 is devoted to it; George Long’s 1877 translation heads it “On attention” and opens: “When you have remitted your attention for a short time, do not imagine this, that you will recover it when you choose.” A lapse forms “a habit of not attending”, then “a habit of deferring your attention”, and no activity is exempt: “Today I choose to play. Well then, ought you not to play with attention?”
The object of this attention is narrow. In Long’s wording the soul is to be kept “directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external”, which places prosoche on the side of what the dichotomy of control calls ours. Carter’s 1758 Enchiridion applies it to company: at a vulgar entertainment, “keep your Attention upon the Stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar Manners.” Marcus Aurelius reports Epictetus asking for the same care in the field of the impulses, so that they be made, in Long’s 1862 wording, “with regard to circumstances”; the Greek there is prosektikon, attentiveness.
Marcus turns the rule on himself in Meditations, VIII, 22: “Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a word.” The next line, “thou choosest rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day”, answers Epictetus’s own question: “If it is good to use attention tomorrow, how much better is it to do so today?” Long’s index also lists Meditations, VI, 53 under attention to what is said. The standing of prosoche as the basic Stoic attitude is a modern reading, set out by Pierre Hadot in Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (1981).
In the texts
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, VIII, 22
Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a word.
Epictetus · Enchiridion, XXXIII
Avoid public and vulgar Entertainments: but, if ever an Occasion calls you to them, keep your Attention upon the Stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar Manners.
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, XI, 37
Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
What the term does not mean
- It is not the mindfulness of modern programmes. Its object in Epictetus is the judgment and the impulse, not the breath or the body, and it is kept up at play and in song, not at a set hour.
- It is not concentration on a task. Long’s worker in wood and ship’s captain are comparisons; what is attended to is one’s own rules and character, “who we are, and what is our name”.
- The word prosoche is not in the English editions. Long and Carter write “attention”; the Greek survives in the title of Discourses IV, 12, and its rank as the root of Stoic practice is Hadot’s reading (1981).
Related terms
- Reserve clause — ὑπεξαίρεσις, μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως (hypexairesis, meth’ hypexaireseōs)
- Prohairesis — προαίρεσις (prohairesis)
- Dichotomy of control — τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν / τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (ta eph’ hēmin, ta ouk eph’ hēmin)
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