Glossary
Reserve clause
ὑπεξαίρεσις, μεθ’ ὑπεξαιρέσεως (hypexairesis, meth’ hypexaireseōs)
The reserve clause is a modern name for what the Stoics called acting with reservation, meth’ hypexaireseōs: an impulse toward an object that carries from the start the condition that nothing prevents it. The phrase “reserve clause” occurs in no ancient text and in none of the editions quoted here; it comes from recent English-language commentary on Stoicism. George Long’s glossary to his 1862 Meditations gives the Greek plainly: hypexairesis, “exception, reservation”, and meth’ hypexaireseōs, “conditionally”.
Marcus Aurelius uses it for a blocked action. In VI, 50, when someone stands in the way by force, “remember that thy attempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities.” What was desired was the effort itself, so the aim is reached even when the outcome is not. VIII, 41 gives the converse: if the effort was made “absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation]”, the obstacle is an evil to a rational being. In Meditations, V, 20 the mind has “the power of acting conditionally and changing”, and turns the obstacle into material for another act.
The source is Epictetus. Carter’s 1758 Enchiridion closes chapter II with “Use only [the requisite Acts] of Pursuit and Avoidance; and even these lightly, and with Gentleness, and Reservation.” Marcus reports the same rule in XI, 37, where Long renders the Greek as movements made “with regard to circumstances”, and where it is joined to attention, prosoche. The reservation bears on the outcome, which belongs to the things not in our power in the dichotomy of control, not on the value of the act or on the effort put into it.
In the texts
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, VI, 50
If however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities.
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, VIII, 41
Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal.
Marcus Aurelius · Meditations, XI, 37
Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.
What the term does not mean
- It is not a formula to be said aloud. In Marcus and Epictetus the reservation is a disposition of the impulse; neither text gives words to recite.
- It is not a way of aiming lower. VI, 50 asks for action “even against their will, when the principles of justice lead that way”; the condition bears on the result, not on the commitment.
- The expression is modern. Long writes “reservation” and “conditionally”, and in XI, 37 “with regard to circumstances”; neither Marcus nor Epictetus speaks of a clause.
Related terms
- Prosoche — προσοχή (prosochē)
- Dichotomy of control — τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν / τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (ta eph’ hēmin, ta ouk eph’ hēmin)
- Amor fati — amor fati (latin)
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